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Firm, Industry and Institutional Perspectives 
 
Igor Filatotchev 
King’s College London (UK) & Vienna University of Economics and Business (Austria) 
 Annette Poulsen 
 University of Georgia Athens (USA) 
 R. Greg Bell 
University of Dallas (USA) 
 
Abstract 
We introduce the topic of this Special Issue of the Journal of Corporate Finance on corporate 
governance of a multinational enterprise with a particular emphasis on the theoretical and 
empirical gaps in prior finance and international business studies associated with corporate 
governance problems and the effectiveness of governance solutions in the context of diverse 
institutional settings. We integrate analysis of the accepted articles with existing research on 
international corporate governance and global strategy. Overall, the work in this area continues 
to emphasize the importance of institutions, legal environment and culture in all aspects of global 
enterprises. We conclude the article with suggestions for future research in this rapidly 
expanding and important area of global business.  
 
Introduction 
The last decade has witnessed significant growth in both policy and research devoted to 
the corporate governance of multi-national enterprises (MNEs).  While corporate finance and 
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international business research fields continue to evaluate the challenges facing MNEs in foreign 
product and capital markets, scholars are also analyzing the underlying corporate governance 
challenges, especially when MNEs operate under different formal regulatory frameworks and in 
varying informal normative and cultural institutional contexts.  There is an urgent need for a 
comprehensive analysis of MNE governance with a focus on the complex interface between 
firm-level governance mechanisms and these diverse institutional contexts. The various legal, 
economic, cultural and political institutions have profound impacts on MNE organization 
including decisions related to capital structure and global business strategy such as cross-border 
M&As, non-market strategies, and performance (Cumming, Filatotchev, Knill, Reeb and Senbet, 
2017).  This Special Issue of Journal of Corporate Finance extends our understanding of 
governance issues in MNEs to embrace corporate finance, strategy and performance dimensions 
together with contextual issues related to national and global institutions. Its objective is to 
address theoretical and empirical gaps in prior finance and international business studies 
associated with corporate governance problems and the effectiveness of governance solutions in 
the context of MNEs.   
With this introduction to the Special Issue, we contribute to a stronger integration of 
research on international corporate finance and global strategy. We argue that both fields offer 
substantial novel perspectives, models, and theories to each other that have the potential to enrich 
our theoretical understanding of relevant phenomena in the context of corporate governance. In 
their seminal review of corporate governance research in finance, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 
773) provide the following definition of corporate governance: “Corporate governance deals 
with the agency problem: the separation of management and finance. The fundamental question 
of corporate governance is how to assure financiers that they get a return on their financial 
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investment.” This agency theory-grounded, closed-system approach has subsequently been 
developed further by “law and finance” theorists who suggested that the workings of governance 
mechanisms are far from being universal, and they may be shaped by the structure of macro-
institutions such as national regulations and laws. More specifically, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, (1997; 1998; 2000) suggest that legal origin is influential in a nation’s 
protection of outside investors, which the authors suggest is largely the purpose of corporate 
governance. Though legal tradition (“common law” and “civil law”) succeeds in explaining 
many cross-sectional differences in corporate governance models adopted by firms around the 
world, critics argue that these broad categories overlook the true complexity of a nation’s system 
of institutions. The influence on capital market mechanisms of national culture, formal and 
informal institutions, a core element in international business research for a long time, has only 
recently entered the world of finance literature – yet, with a substantial impact (Karolyi, 2016). 
Bearing in mind that MNEs are global firms that operate across national borders in global 
product and capital markets, a complex interface between the firm, its governance mechanism 
and multiple institutional environments represents a core focal area of this Special Issue. 
The call for papers for this Special Issue welcomed both theoretical and empirical papers 
exploring different aspects and dimensions of corporate governance of MNEs. Ten papers were 
accepted for a paper development workshop in Atlanta in August 2017, and eight of those papers 
appear in this Special Issue. Taken together, these papers provide a novel contribution to 
corporate governance research by focusing on international dimensions of corporate governance 
and the implications of macro-level, institutional factors on the governance processes and 
outcomes across national borders.  
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 This introduction to the Special Issue is organized as follows. The next section discusses 
country and institutional aspects of corporate governance. The section thereafter discusses a 
complex interface between corporate governance, business strategy and formal and informal 
institutions. The third section looks more specifically at the integration of global corporate 
governance considerations in debt markets. The last section offers concluding remarks and 
suggestions for further research. 
 
Country and institutional impacts on firm governance 
This Special Issue provides a chance to reflect on the importance of the national and 
institutional environment on the activities of MNEs. The institutions, laws and culture of 
countries have long been recognized to play important roles in economic development within 
those countries. For example, North (1990, 1991) analyzed how formal or informal rules and 
customs of countries were key in the development of productive economies throughout history. 
More recently, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (e.g., 1998, 2000) established a 
line of research focused on the legal origins of a country and how that origin impacted economic 
growth. They argue that countries whose legal systems are based on English common law 
support stronger protection of investor and creditor rights and that these legal protections 
encourage development of financial markets characterized by better corporate governance 
standards than those in countries with a legal system based on civil law and the Napoleonic code.  
This emphasis on the role of institutions and culture in the analysis of economic growth is 
omnipresent in research on economic development of financial markets. Stulz (2000) argues that 
underlying financial structures (e.g., the system through which payments are made or the 
transparency of information in financial transactions) are key to financial development, as 
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measured through stock market or GDP growth characteristics. Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2007) 
confirm in empirical tests the importance of country characteristics, including the enforceability 
of investor rights and transparency of information, in determining firm-specific corporate 
governance. They show that firm governance ratings are tied more strongly to their country 
environment than to their own firm characteristics and that the relation between firm 
characteristics and governance ratings is weakest in less-developed countries. Thus, they suggest 
that the lack of country-wide protections leads to an environment in which firms do not benefit 
from good firm-level governance. Claessens and Yurtoglu (2013) extend the analysis of the 
importance of country characteristics in determining firm governance standards in their survey 
on corporate governance in emerging markets. Confirming the analysis of Doidge, et al., they 
review research showing that firm-specific corporate governance is most effective in countries 
with strong governance and investor rights. However, both Doidge, et al., and Claessens and 
Yurtoglu suggest that firm-specific governance standards can ultimately improve a firm’s access 
to investors even when the country’s governance system is weak.  
An important strand of the institutional perspective on corporate governance is focused 
on the drivers and outcomes of national and international governance rules and regulations and 
MNE’s compliance (and non-compliance) with them. Bartram (2018, this issue) considers how 
governmental development of one type of financial market can expand corporate opportunities 
for firms and economic growth in a country. He explores the question of how nonfinancial firms 
around the world use derivatives. Corporate usage of derivatives is generally assumed to be 
based on a need for hedging uncertain or risky cash flows. Alternatively, they can be used as a 
means to speculate in the underlying assets. If used for speculation, regulatory bodies might take 
a stricter view of their usage. Bartram, however, finds little evidence that firms use derivatives 
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for speculative purposes. In his analysis of more than 6500 firms from 47 countries, he finds that 
firms on average use derivatives primarily to reduce volatility in their cash flows, especially 
volatility caused by exchange rate or interest rate risk. While he finds that the overall use of 
derivatives does not depend on country-level corporate governance or access to derivative 
markets, he does find that reduction in risk is larger in countries with easier access to derivatives. 
He concludes, therefore, that policymakers in developing economies could help to lower the 
riskiness of firms’ cash flows through pursuing strategies that encourage the development of 
local-currency derivatives markets. Thus, country initiatives to develop one type of financial 
market could lead to overall economic growth. 
From another perspective, Akhtar, Akhtar, John and Wong (2018, this issue) study “bad 
behavior” by firms across the world. While many compliance issues have been studied in 
specific countries, Akhtar et al. extend this research to an analysis of charges of tax evasion 
against MNEs in the Financial Times Top 500. Akhtar et al. use this international cross-section 
to not only examine the related wealth effects of tax evasion charges (they report slightly 
negative wealth effects at announcement but no long-run performance declines) but to also 
consider how internal corporate governance and country-specific characteristics impact the 
probability of undertaking tax evasion activities and the wealth impacts of those activities. From 
the internal firm governance perspective, factors such as stronger shareholder rights, higher 
proportion of female board membership and higher institutional ownership are all associated 
with lower probability of tax evasion, consistent with these groups generally being supportive of 
appropriate corporate behavior. They also report that country characteristics are important to the 
probability of tax evasion occurring. More specifically, MNEs are more likely to commit tax 
evasion in countries with higher corruption levels. These findings generally confirm findings in 
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studies of US firms. In addition, Akhtar et al. are able to identify important changes in 
international law and OECD guidelines that have had a deterrent effect on tax evasion. Their 
results suggest that firms are responsive to increased penalties and that policymakers would be 
able to change the probability of tax evasion through stronger enforcement. This research again 
emphasizes the importance of country governance standards and institutions for economic 
growth and stability. 
 Firm-level governance undoubtedly impacts overall profitability and growth of the 
corporate sector. However, the research on MNEs also confirms the importance of the 
environment in which a firm operates in framing and distinguishing its decision-making. The 
role of institutions, whether formal rules or cultural standards, in determining economic activity 
from the earliest human interactions, to the development of long-distance trade in the mid-20
th
 
century, to today’s globalization is increasingly recognized. The overall consensus is that every 
firm’s interactions with investors, customers, competitors and regulatory bodies and its decisions 
on maximization of the firm’s goals is inevitably a function of and reaction to the legal and 
political environment in which it operates. There is also a growing recognition of the importance 
of other types of institutions. In the following section we discuss a complex interaction between 
the MNE’s governance and business strategy in a richer context of formal and informal 
institutions.  
 
International business strategy, firm-level governance and CSR 
From a theoretical point of view, most of the empirical literature on corporate governance 
in MNEs has been rooted in agency theory and is concerned with linking different aspects of 
corporate governance with the firm’s internationalization decisions and performance.  The 
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assumption is that by managing the principal-agency problem between shareholders and 
managers, firms will operate more efficiently and perform better. The central premise of this 
framework is that managers as agents of shareholders (principals) can engage in self-serving 
behaviour that may be inconsistent with the shareholders’ wealth maximization principle 
(Filatotchev and Wright, 2011). 
In the context of MNEs, internationalization strategies are associated with information 
asymmetries and substantial risks, especially when firms invest in emerging markets with 
relatively less developed legal and business environments. As a result, the specific FDI decisions 
may also be related to the risk preferences and decision-making horizons of managers and the 
other main shareholder constituencies as suggested by agency theory. Given that the firm’s 
degree of internationalization is an important determinant of the complexity it faces, FDI strategy 
will depend on the ability of the parent to deal with information asymmetries and potential 
agency conflicts associated with overseas ventures. Therefore, FDI decisions should also depend 
on the firm’s governance characteristics, such as the distribution of ownership and control 
(Fama, 1980). 
These theoretical arguments suggest that institutional differences between the MNE’s 
home and host countries may create significant information asymmetries and agency costs 
associated with global business strategies. Therefore, firm-level governance mechanisms, such as 
ownership structure, board composition, and internal and external control mechanisms should 
have material impact on the MNE’s internationalization strategy and performance. Within 
economics and corporate finance, for example, a substantial body of research has focused on the 
governance roles of dominant block-holders, especially in the environment of emerging and less 
developed economies (Claessens et al., 2000). In the context of MNEs from South-East Asia and 
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elsewhere, family owners and other block-holders have been identified as an important 
governance constituency that may shape strategic decisions, including internationalization 
(Claessens et al., 2000).  
More recent studies have shifted emphasis towards “softer” governance factors, such as 
political connections of board members. Schweizer, Walker and Zhang (2018, this issue) explore 
whether and how political connections affect the likelihood of completing a cross-border M&A 
deal for Chinese publicly listed, but privately-owned enterprises and the resulting firm 
performance. These authors propose a political connection trade-off theory and find that Chinese 
firms with politically connected top managers are more likely to complete a cross-border M&A 
deal than firms with no such connections, but that this comes at the cost of negative 
announcement returns and subsequent lower accounting performance. These findings support the 
idea that politically connected top managers engage in “political empire building” behavior at the 
cost of shareholders’ wealth. 
These diverse in terms of their theoretical focus and empirical setting studies share one 
common heuristic lens – they suggest that internationalization exposes the MNE to significant 
uncertainties, and its governance structures define how the firm responds strategically to address 
these uncertainties and take advantage of global business opportunities.  
Chen, Zhang and Hobdari (2018, this issue) demonstrate an additional consideration that 
can increase uncertainty for firm activities. They find that in cross-border acquisitions made by 
US firms, the various blockholders of the acquirer take different stances with respect to the 
acquisition. They distinguish between family blockholders, banks and mutual funds and find that 
banks are more likely to cooperate with family blockholders because of their long-term banking 
relationships with the firm while mutual funds are more independent and thus more likely to exit. 
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By basing their research about the decisions of various blockholders in the setting of cross-
border acquisitions, the authors illustrate important considerations MNE firms must react to in 
their business and financial decisions and lend support to the controversial nature of many cross-
border acquisition programs. 
Recent studies suggest that the very exposure to different institutional environments may 
affect the MNE’s governance characteristics themselves. Conyon, Hass, Vergauwe and Zhang 
(2018, this issue), for example, investigate the relationship between foreign experience and CEO 
compensation using a sample of large UK firms from the FTSE 350 index from 2003 to 2011. 
The authors find that foreign CEOs and national CEOs with foreign working experience receive 
significantly higher levels of total compensation compared to those without. Moreover, the 
foreign CEO pay premium is stronger in firms that are more globalized. These results show that 
executive incentives are attributable to the specialized foreign expertise and foreign networks of 
CEOs, which stem from foreign experience rather than broader general managerial skills. 
More recent sociology-grounded research suggests that governance is a product not only 
of coordinative demands imposed by market efficiency, but also of rationalized norms 
legitimizing the adoption of appropriate governance practices (Bell, Filatotchev and Aguilera, 
2014). More specifically, institutional theorists predict that regulative, normative and cognitive 
institutions put pressure on firms to compete for resources on the basis of economic efficiency. 
However, institutional pressures may also compel firms to conform to expected social behavior 
and demands of a wider body of stakeholders. In other words, the ability of organization to 
achieve social acceptance will depend on, in addition to efficiency concerns, the ability of its 
governance systems to commit to stewardship management practices, stakeholders’ interests, and 
societal expectations.  
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These theoretical arguments may have far-reaching implications for corporate 
governance in the MNE context. In a recent paper, Krause, Filatotchev and Bruton (2016) 
observe that institutional characteristics of foreign product markets influence the structure of 
boards of directors of U.S. firms active in these markets. They argue that allocating greater, 
outwardly visible power to the CEO will build the firm’s legitimacy among customers who are 
culturally more comfortable with high levels of power distance. Scholars rarely conceptualize 
boards as tools firms can use to manage product markets’ demand-side uncertainty, but the 
results of this study suggest they should. Clearly, cognitive institutional characteristics of foreign 
product markets can also have an effect on a MNE’s governance, even if the firm is incorporated 
and headquartered in the United States.  
Goergen, Chahine, Wood and Brewster (2018, this issue) extend these arguments by 
looking at issues related to institutional impact on corporate social responsibility (CSR) aspects 
of MNEs. These authors ask questions:  Are MNEs more socially responsible, and where is this 
more likely to occur? Are firms less responsible in emerging or transitional economies, and what 
impact does the dominant national corporate governance regime have? The authors explore the 
association between public listing and the existence of a CSR code within specific institutional 
settings and assess whether MNEs are any different to their local counterparts, based on an 
internationally comparative survey. They find that listed firms as well as firms from civil law 
countries are more likely to have CSR statements. MNEs are also more likely to have CSR 
statement, independent of their country of origin.  
 Therefore, prior research in general, and papers in this Special Issue in particular, suggest 
that the inter-relationship between firm-level governance characteristics of MNEs and their 
home- and host-country institutions is more complex than it was previously understood. Indeed, 
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governance factors generally shape the MNE’s strategic responses to different institutional 
settings they operate in, as well as their performance outcomes. At the same time, institutional 
factors may have an impact on the MNE’s governance per se, and global firms constantly adjust 
their governance characteristics strategically when they target different product and factor 
markets overseas. 
 
Institutions and the governance role of debt  
Today an extraordinary percentage of the world’s financial capital flows across 
international borders (Schularick, 2016).  There are several reasons why firms are looking to 
raise capital resources outside of their home markets.  For example, the increasing integration of 
global capital markets in recent decades has made it easier for firms to raise both debt and equity 
in foreign capital markets.  A number of regulatory and institutional developments have 
contributed to this “financial globalization” (Azzimonti, De Francisco, and Quadrini, 2014; 
Stulz, 2005).  These include the establishment of stock exchanges in several major financial 
centers requiring lower levels of transparency of listed firms as well as changes in regulations in 
many countries that give investors the opportunity to invest in foreign equities (Bekaert, Harvey, 
and Lundblad, 2003). In addition, listing in a foreign market can result in access to more liquid 
markets, debt capital at lower costs and better terms, and a wider investor base than they would 
have in their home capital market (Claessens and Schmukler, 2007).  
Research in finance, strategy, and international business has largely focused on the 
challenges that organizations face when attempting to source equity capital abroad and how 
those costs can be mitigated through better corporate governance practices (Miletkov, Poulsen, 
Wintoki, 2014).  However, the largest component of the international capital market is the bond 
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market (Lau and Yu, 2009).  Between 1991-2005, one-third of all capital raised through debt 
issues was raised in markets other than the firm's home market (Gozzi, Levine, and Schmukler, 
2010). While researchers such as Fan, Titman and Twite (2012) have shown that a country’s 
legal and tax system and other institutional considerations such as the level of corruption play an 
important role in capital structure decisions in within country analysis,  little attention in finance, 
strategy and international business research has been devoted to understanding why firms choose 
to source debt in foreign capital markets, whether firms incur additional costs when attempting to 
issue debt in foreign markets, and the conditions that factor into the success of foreign bond 
offers.  
Both equity and debt involve agency costs associated with monitoring, enforcing, and 
constraining decisions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  Research in finance has explored the 
existence of stockholder-bondholder conflicts which primarily manifest in terms of wealth 
appropriation and risk shifting.  In contrast, bondholders have no voting rights but can still 
exercise control through monitoring and restrictive covenants.  In countries like Japan and 
Germany, the monitoring function is predominantly carried out by debtholders (i.e., banks).  
Hence, capital structure decisions have important governance implications.  
A growing body of comparative corporate governance research suggests that governance 
practices are “embedded” within the wider context of formal and informal institutions, such as 
laws, regulations, and cognitive expectations of the governance participants (Cumming, 
Filatotchev, Knill, Reeb, and Senbet, 2017). For example, Buchanan, Netter, Poulsen and Yang 
(2012) show that differing shareholder proposal rules in the US and the UK result in significant 
differences in the number and types of proposals in each country, with UK proposals generally 
being more expensive for shareholders to make but also potentially more successful at changing 
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firm behaviour. It seems reasonable to conclude that the institutional differences between the 
firm’s home country and host capital markets also have governance implications given that 
agency costs and governance properties of debt may vary across different capital markets.  
One reason for the popularity in raising debt abroad is that firms stand to raise debt at 
lower overall costs and with lower compensation being paid to underwriters (Petrasek, 2010).  
Yet despite the growing popularity, a growing body of research shows that foreign firms are at a 
disadvantage compared to local firms in foreign debt markets.  Indeed, there is extensive 
evidence that firms suffer from home bias when they try to source debt outside of their home 
market (Fidora, Fratzscher, & Thimann 2006; Burger & Warnock 2007).  Atilgan, Ghosh, and 
Zhang (2010) found that not only do cross-listed bonds have lower initial ratings, but they are 
also less likely to be upgraded and take longer to be upgraded compared to U.S. domestic bonds 
with similar issuer and issue characteristics.  Hence, it is likely that firms must evaluate the costs 
and benefits associated with sourcing debt abroad.  
In this Special Issue Gu et al. (2018, this issue) point out that there has been considerable 
research in the field of international business on the additional costs that a firm faces while 
entering and operating in foreign markets. These additional costs that a local firm would not 
incur are referred to as liabilities of foreignness (LOF) (Zaheer, 1995).  The authors investigate 
whether LOF is a function of distance between the home country and the host capital market, and 
rely upon multiple conceptualizations of distance to capture the extent to which distance may 
contribute to LOF in among firms sourcing debt abroad.  Their results show that firms are 
increasingly looking to source debt in foreign bond markets, and that distance increases the costs 
that firms face when sourcing debt abroad. The authors’ key argument is that, other things being 
equal, differences in macro-level, socio-economic environments in home and host countries 
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affect the extent of the firm’s liability of foreignness in global debt even in the situations when 
fix-claim investors have fairly comprehensive understanding of the firm’s business model and 
the associated growth prospects. They also contribute to the understanding of economic 
significance of socio-economic distance by differentiating among the effects of various 
dimensions of institutional distance between the firm’s home and host countries in the context of 
international debt markets. 
Also in this Special Issue Mullner and Dorobantu (2018, this issue) point out that most 
research on the governance of international investments has focused only on the equity side of 
these investments. As such, this research has largely overlooked the fact that cross-border 
investments involve large shares of debt and that creditors pay a critical role in financing and 
governing foreign investments. They study syndicated debt as a governance instrument in 5,928 
large infrastructure investments and find that international loan syndicates strategically increase 
geographic distance between partners as a means of governing investments in host countries with 
high political risk. The authors discuss how expanding across geographic distance allows 
syndicates to tap into non-redundant sources of political, social and economic leverage (i.e. 
external leverage).   
 
Future research 
We hope that this Special Issue will help to build the foundation for greater 
understanding not only of performance outcomes of different governance mechanisms in the 
context of MNEs, but also of a complex interaction of firm-level governance charactersitics with 
meso- and macro-factors such as the firm’s industry and institutional environments. Our review 
of the state-of-the-art research in finance and international business, as well as papers in this 
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Special Issue suggests that the structure and processes of corporate governance are embedded in 
formal and informal institutions, and MNEs by the very nature of their global operations are 
exposed to a diverse range of institutional pressures in their home and host countries that 
ultimately shape their governance settings and, subsequently, business startegy and performance.  
The recognition of sometimes conflicting demands imposed by regulatory, normative and 
cognitive institutions points to a number of promising avenues for future research. For example, 
Krause et al. (2016) provide evidence that whereas governance activists view CEO power as 
illegitimate, customers in product markets characterized by high cultural power distance view 
CEO power as a legitimizing force. In support of this “demand-side” argument, the authors 
found that firms selling primarily to high-power-distance countries conferred more power on 
their CEOs. It remains unknown, however,  whether informal, cultural institutions abroad affect 
the MNE’s governance configurations when the firm must simultaneously build legitimacy with 
stock market investors. It also remains unknown whether investors value the MNE’s compliance 
with demands associated with normative and cognitive legitimacy in foreign markets or if their 
valuations of firms follow agency norms exclusively. 
The recent accumulation of research examining the differences between the institutional 
environments of emerging and developed economies suggests firms need to employ specific 
strategies to acquire capital market resources outside of their home markets, and that these 
strategies may be function of the institutional characteristics of the host country. For example, 
certain governance signals, such as stock-based executive compensation is so prevalent in the 
U.S. that it has achieved a “taken for granted status” (Sanders and Boivie, 2004: 171) whereas 
this form of governance signal may be less accepted in other host capital markets.  Likewise, 
large investment banks are relevant social actors in the US capital market and could conceivably 
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confer legitimacy to foreign firms seeking capital on US exchanges.  On the other hand, the 
value of other capital market intermediaries may be more salient to firms attempting to secure 
financial resources in other capital market contexts. Similarly, Miletkov, Poulsen and Wintoki 
(2016) show that foreign directors are especially beneficial to firms operating in countries with 
lower quality legal institutions.  As these examples suggest, it is important to recognize that the 
ability of governance signals and endorsement to improve the performance of foreign equity and 
bond offerings may be contingent on both home and host institutional environments.  Therefore, 
the impact of the institutional environment of a country on the likelihood of success of foreign 
offerings is certainly a promising avenue for further research.  
In addition to understanding the role of governance signals, a growing body of research 
in the finance area suggests that there are information spillovers from product markets to capital 
markets.  Evidence in support of product market spillover to capital markets is provided by 
Frieder and Subrahmanyam (2005) who found that individual investors prefer to invest in stocks 
with easily recognized products.  Further, studies have found that a firm’s advertising 
expenditures is related to number of both individual and institutional investors as well as 
liquidity for its common stock (Grullon, Kanatas and Weston, 2004) and higher stock valuation 
(Chemmanur and Yan, 2009).  A study by Keloharju, Knupfer and Linnainmaa (2010) found that 
investors are more likely to purchase and less likely to sell shares of companies they frequent as 
customers.  Extending this line of research to evaluate the extent to which a firm’s success in 
product markets enhances its success in foreign capital markets is another area of future research. 
Indeed, given that firms face disadvantages when competing abroad in both product and capital 
markets an investigation of their interactions would constitute an important area for future 
research.  Research should also investigate the range of benefits, beyond the immediate financial, 
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that firms derive when source financial resources outside of their home markets.  Indeed, there 
may be specific situations where sourcing debt abroad may actually prove beneficial to the long-
term survival of the firm, or to help foster a comprehensive capital raising strategy.   
Mulherin, Netter and Poulsen (2017) highlight the importance of cultural factors and the 
institutional environment in research on international mergers and acquisitions. For example, 
Ahern, Daminelli and Fracassi (2015) compare the success of cross-country acquisitions as a 
function of the cultural distance between the acquiring and target countries. They find that 
greater cultural distance significantly reduces the probability of mergers cross countries and 
lower synergy gains if mergers do occur. Further emphasizing the importance of the institutional 
environment, Dinc and Erel (2013) show that in countries with strong nationalist leanings, it is 
more difficult for a foreign firm to gain government approval of a cross-border acquisition. 
Mergers and acquisitions are some of the most significant actions taken by firms and research in 
this area is increasingly recognizing the importance of institutional factors in cross-border 
transactions and much research remains to be done to more fully understand the role of the 
institutional environment in the globalization of industry through mergers and acquisitions. 
Holderness (2016), for example, adds a caveat to existing international analysis, arguing that 
usage of aggregate country-level data can be misleading when applied to individual firm 
behavior and cross-country analysis must be performed carefully to avoid incorrect inferences.  
Foreign debt offerings hold the potential for finance, strategy and international business 
researchers to address a wide array of research questions, and especially those related to the 
governance properties of debt.  For instance, it is widely recognized both among practitioners 
and researchers that decisions regarding the capital structure of a firm can have significant 
implications for a firm’s long-term success.  There is a long tradition of research on the relation 
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between capital structure and corporate strategy.  Although the implications of equity ownership 
and more specifically that of institutional ownership, blockholder ownership, and insider 
ownership on firm decisions have been studied extensively, there seems to be little research on 
the implications of different types of debt.  Debt holders monitor firms they lend to and influence 
firm decisions in order to ensure that debt is repaid.  Therefore, there is an increasing recognition 
in the literature that debt is heterogeneous.  For example, David, O’Brien and Yoshikawa (2000) 
showed that relational debt has characteristics that provide appropriate governance compared to 
transactional debt which imposes strict contractual constraints.    
The increasing integration of capital markets adds a new dimension to the complex 
problem of choosing an appropriate capital structure.  Firms today have access to debt markets 
outside their country of origin and bond issues in foreign markets are becoming increasingly 
common.  Although the cost of debt may be a prime consideration in making these choices, we 
believe that the decision to access foreign capital markets involves much more than simple 
comparisons of cost of debt in different markets.  Given the wide variation in disclosure 
standards and monitoring intensity across capital markets, a consideration of institutional 
differences is critical in understanding both firm decisions with regard to where to access debt 
markets and subsequent implications for a firm’s strategic choices.   
While we have listed a number of interesting areas in which researchers can evaluate the 
success of foreign debt offers, there are certainly many more worth considering.  Indeed, much 
of what is known about capital raising activities of firms has been confined to equity markets.  
Foreign bonds can provide a rich context in which scholars can further understand capital raising 
activities of firms, factors that impact market choice decisions, and how firms can overcome 
home country disadvantages.  
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In terms of research methods, cognizance needs to be taken of the data and methods 
adopted to address this research agenda. Bigger datasets are now available compared to the first 
wave of comparative governance studies.  Much recent research, especially in finance, has 
involved the building of global datasets but has been accompanied by little theorizing or analysis 
of cross-country differences. The richness of these global datasets would seem to us to offer 
many so far unexploited opportunities for the examination of between institution effects. 
However, many recent editorials and commentary pieces have cautioned researchers against 
searching for publishable significant empirical results, what has become known as “p-hacking,” 
without grounding their research on strong theoretical foundations and appropriate 
methodological procedures. For example, Campbell Harvey (2017) in his American Finance 
Association address states, “with the combination of unreported tests, lack of adjustment for 
multiple tests, and direct and in-direct p-hacking, many of the results being published will fail to 
hold up.” (p. 1). The editors of the Journal of International Business Studies (Meyer, van 
Witteloostuijin and Beugelsdijk, 2017) discuss best practices “with respect to conducting, 
reporting, and discussing the results of quantitative hypothesis-testing research.” (p. 535). Large 
international databases invite researchers to correlate country-specific variables with firm 
product-market, governance or investment characteristics without careful analysis of why the 
correlations are being studied and the validity of those correlations. In addition, Karolyi (2016) 
notes the “fragility” in many of the cross-country institutional measures. It is important to 
question data reliability and comparability given the differences in collection, reporting and 
interpretation across countries and to ensure that research projects have a strong theoretical and 
conceptual foundation.  
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To conclude, this special issue highlights promising avenues for future corporate 
governance research for scholars in many fields, including, finance, economics, accounting and 
international business. In this article, we have summarized the findings of the papers presented in 
this special issue and outlined an agenda for further research on the governance aspects of MNEs 
with a particular focus on institutional dimensions. While there have been important global 
developments in terms of internationalization of product and capital markets, systematic research 
on the governance aspects of the MNEs remains under-developed. We have identified a number 
of important themes that will both help our understanding of the field and also should provide an 
evidence base for policy-makers and regulators at both national and international levels. 
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